Ways to be blameworthy : rightness, wrongness, and responsibility / Elinor Mason.

By: Mason, Elinor [author.]
Material type: TextTextPublisher: Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2019Copyright date: ©2019Edition: First editionDescription: viii, 237 pages ; 23 cmContent type: text Media type: unmediated Carrier type: volumeISBN: 0198833601; 9780198833604Subject(s): Right and wrong | Blame | Blame | Right and wrong | 08.38 ethicsDDC classification: 170 LOC classification: BJ1451 | .M37 2019
Contents:
Introduction -- Subjective obligation -- Trying to do well by morality -- Ordinary praiseworthiness and blameworthiness -- Praise and blame -- Excuses -- Exemptions -- Taking responsibility -- Conclusion.
Summary: There must be some connection between our deontic notions, rightness and wrongness, and our responsibility notions, praise- and blameworthiness. Yet traditional approaches to each set of concepts tend to take the other set for granted. This book takes an integrated approach to these questions, drawing on both ethics and responsibility theory, and thereby illuminating both sets of concepts. Elinor Mason describes this as 'normative responsibility theory': the primary aim is not to give an account of the conditions of agency, but to give an account of what sort of wrong action makes blame fitting. She presents a pluralistic view of both obligation and blameworthiness, identifying three different ways to be blameworthy, corresponding to different ways of acting wrongly. First, ordinary blameworthiness is essentially connected to subjective wrongness, to acting wrongly by one's own lights. Subjective obligation, and ordinary blame, apply only to those who are within our moral community, who understand and share our value system. By contrast, detached blame can apply even when the agent is outside our moral community, and has no sense that her act is morally wrong. In detached blame, the blame rather than the blameworthiness is fundamental. Finally, agents can take responsibility for some inadvertent wrongs, and thus become responsible. This third sort of blameworthiness, 'extended blameworthiness', applies when the agent understands the objective wrongness of her act, but has no bad will. In such cases, the social context may be such that the agent should take responsibility, and accept ordinary blame from the wronged party.
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
Star ratings
    Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
Holdings
Item type Current library Class number Status Date due Barcode
Books / Monographs Dominican University College Library / Collège Universitaire Dominicain
Hours of operation: Monday - Thursday 8am - 8:30 pm; Friday 8am - 4pm | Les heures d'ouverture : Lundi à jeudi de 8 h à 20 h 30; vendredi 8h - 16h
Standard shelving location / Rayonnage standard
BJ 1451 .M37 2019 (Browse shelf (Opens below)) Available 100000002446

Includes bibliographical references (pages 215-227) and indexes.

Introduction -- Subjective obligation -- Trying to do well by morality -- Ordinary praiseworthiness and blameworthiness -- Praise and blame -- Excuses -- Exemptions -- Taking responsibility -- Conclusion.

There must be some connection between our deontic notions, rightness and wrongness, and our responsibility notions, praise- and blameworthiness. Yet traditional approaches to each set of concepts tend to take the other set for granted. This book takes an integrated approach to these questions, drawing on both ethics and responsibility theory, and thereby illuminating both sets of concepts. Elinor Mason describes this as 'normative responsibility theory': the primary aim is not to give an account of the conditions of agency, but to give an account of what sort of wrong action makes blame fitting. She presents a pluralistic view of both obligation and blameworthiness, identifying three different ways to be blameworthy, corresponding to different ways of acting wrongly. First, ordinary blameworthiness is essentially connected to subjective wrongness, to acting wrongly by one's own lights. Subjective obligation, and ordinary blame, apply only to those who are within our moral community, who understand and share our value system. By contrast, detached blame can apply even when the agent is outside our moral community, and has no sense that her act is morally wrong. In detached blame, the blame rather than the blameworthiness is fundamental. Finally, agents can take responsibility for some inadvertent wrongs, and thus become responsible. This third sort of blameworthiness, 'extended blameworthiness', applies when the agent understands the objective wrongness of her act, but has no bad will. In such cases, the social context may be such that the agent should take responsibility, and accept ordinary blame from the wronged party.

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.

Powered by Koha